1. You started your career at Melbourne-based The Age. In the late 1970s, you started your life as a foreign correspondent, first in China for Fairfax and Financial Times. From that time to 1998, you worked in China, Cairo and America before you headed back to Australia and became a political editor for The Age. It was an impressive foreign correspondence portfolio, what was it like to report on China for Australian audience in the late 1970s?
It was a very interesting time in China, as Deng Xiaoping had just re-asserted himself and initiated an opening to the outside world. As a correspondent, a lot of my time was spent assessing how far China would go in this opening process. China’s relations with the United States had been normalized in 1978. So we had many American correspondents come to Beijing and establish bureaus there. Almost anything you reported about China in those days would get people's attention in the wider world.
2. What interested Australian audience about China at the time?
Australia normalized its relations with China in 1972 when Mr. Gough Whitlam became prime minister. It was one of his first acts as the new Labor prime minister. It had seemed to many of us anyway, who paid attention to China, and what was going on in our part of the world that it was ridiculous that Australia didn't have relations with the People's Republic. Australia maintained the fiction, as you know, that Taiwan represented all of China. Taipei held the China seat in the United Nations Security Council. It was an absurd situation.
I first went to China, as a correspondent for Australian Broadcasting in 1976. It was a very strange experience for me. It was hard to discern what was really going on in the country, as things on the surface seemed sort of unreal. We went to Liaoning Province to look at the Liberation Army truck factory. Interestingly enough on that assignment, we went as well to Pyongyang. We went to North Korea. Australia, at that point, had diplomatic relations with Pyongyang. On that assignment with then Australian Foreign Minister Don Willesee we also went to Japan and South Korea. It was a fairly unique perspective in those days.
3. Apart from China, you have also been reporting on the United State in the late 1990s. You were also the North America editor for Fairfax in the early 2000s before you decided to conclude your correspondent career. In history, we’ve seen quite a close relationship between Australia and the United States. For today’s Australians, how do they view the Australia-United States relationship?
I have to say it's difficult to separate China from the Australian relationship with the United States. Historically, certainly since the Second World War, America has been hugely significant for Australia in a security sense. It's been our security guarantor. We have a security alliance, the ANZUS Treaty, which obliges either party to come to the other's assistance in the event that their security is threatened. So that really underpins the relationship between Australia and the United States. Australian politicians often say that Australia is America's most steadfast ally. We fought alongside America in just about every war since World War One, and the Battle of Hamel, they keep reminding us.
Our payment of an insurance premium on our security relationship with America has involved us supporting America militarily in the various conflicts that it's become engaged in. People like me would question the advisability of that carte blanche. For example, I'm not sure if it was so wise for us to get involved in the Iraq conflict. We did that because of this ongoing commitment in the security sense that we have to the United States.
For the last several decades of least, Australia has viewed its relationship with the United States in conjunction with its relationship with China because China has assumed so much importance to Australia in an economic sense. It’s clear to me that the ground rules are shifting. That's forcing Australia to reassess its relationships with the United States and with China, in the context, of our place in this part of the world, our place in the southwest Pacific.
4. I would like to ask about the independent investigation that Scott Morrison has raised regarding the COVID-19 This has caused a lot of debate and the Chinese ambassador to Australia actually said that the country will see a consumer boycott in China. And this month we see that China implemented the tariffs on Australia's barley and banned Australian beef. What do you think is the reasoning behind Morrison governments to take this step?
I think Mr Morrison overreached when he took it upon himself to lead the charge on the investigation into the COVID-19 virus and its origins and China's responsibility for it. What he should have done is to join forces with like-minded countries. Mr Morrison should have been part of a collection of like-minded countries in pushing for this investigation.
There's every argument to investigate what happened, look into how the World Health Organisation particularly handled the issue and China's responsibility for its origins. That would have been an unexceptional thing for Mr Morrison to have done. Instead, he stuck his neck out. And the Chinese for whatever reason used Australia as an example of a country that it could try to exert pressure on for taking actions that might displease it. I'm not advocating here for China, let’s be clear, but we should hesitate before we take actions which end up causing more problems than they’re worth. It was a mistake for Australia to take the lead as opposed to joining other like-minded countries in pushing for an inquiry.
5. Compared with another country, like for example, let's say Canada, which faced a similar siege situation in regards to the relationship with China last year, while keeping a distance from Washington's call for Beijing, Beijing's responsibility, how they Australia take this stance from this narrative of China's responsibility for COVID-19. And what would be your opinion on this?
I'm assuming you are referring to the Meng Wanzhou case (this is the case involving US attempts to extradite from Canada Huawei’s chief investment officer on breaches of Iran sanctions), which has caused enormous problems between the United States, Canada and China. Australia has its own citizens being detained in China. It’s a tricky issue. This is an extremely complex issue. We should push hard for the release of our own citizens. Just as Beijing ganged up on Australia for taking the lead on the Coronavirus inquiry, Canada's being subjected to similar treatment over its arrest of Meng Wanzhou at the request of the United States. Several of its citizens have been held in China for an indefinite period in what looks to me like a case of hostage diplomacy.
6. How do you evaluate the Morison government's approach to China?
It's undergoing a sort of a learning process, in the sense that it's not quite sure how to get the policy settings right. There's been a bit of inconsistency in policies and policy statements. I think that's caused some confusion.
So on one hand, Mr. Morrison has got some of the right instincts. On the other, he gets pushed off course on occasions. What we need in this country is a very consistent approach to dealing with China. We need clearly established policy parameters. And they need to be clearly understood and firmly stated, and the Chinese need to be able to be left in no doubt about what we think about things. China policy has been subject to a process where the government itself hasn't appeared to be entirely certain how to handle its relationship with China and of course, handle its triangular relationship with the United States and China. That’s caused a level of uncertainty. That's not a good thing.
We should be very clear about what our priorities are, we should not be afraid to state them clearly if we disagree with the Chinese, and we will, of course on a whole range of issues. I can think of half a dozen now that you could mention. This includes its activities in the South China Sea or its treatment of the Uighur population or its approach to Hong Kong.
7. In the past year, we see the liberals themselves have kept changing their leadership from Tony Abbott to Malcolm Turnbull, and then to Scott Morrison, do you think this frequent change of leadership affects the Liberals’ approach to China?
The frequent changes of leadership have not been a good thing. I think what's important sometimes in foreign relationships is for leaders to establish personal relationships with each other, and if you're going to chop and change leaders as regularly as we have, that makes it more difficult for a leader to establish a personal relationship with another leader. In the case of John Howard, he established quite a good personal relationship with Jiang Zemin. They encountered each other quite frequently at APEC meetings and so forth. That's useful. In our Australian case, because we've had these changes of leadership as frequently as we have, it hasn't been helpful as far as formulating consistent policy is concerned, and perhaps more important, establishing consistent relationships.
8. And on and in your column for the conversation. You seem to criticize Scott Morrison and a coalition government that they fought too easily been affected by hawkish stance within the Australian politics towards Beijing. Would you mind elaborate a little bit more on this trend for our readers?
It appears that China have got the upper hand in the policy making process in Canberra. And I wasn't sure if this was necessarily healthy and productive from a national interest standpoint. For example, our recent experience of China's pushback on the Coronavirus inquiry, Morrison having taken the lead on the issue. China’s reaction may have served as something of a wake up call for the Australian Government about the complexities and the difficulties of navigating in a very challenging foreign and security policy environment.
What we have to do in this country is to adopt a fairly sophisticated approach to how we manage all of this. We have to learn to be a bit more subtle about the way in which we navigate what is a very complex situation.
9. My next question is about Victoria's premier Daniel Andrews signed the One Belt one road contract in 2018. But the coalition has been against it. And also Labor's federally Albanese three days ago told Australia that he was not a fan of the PRI either. How do you view this internal labor conflict regarding BRI?
The Victorian State premier Mr Andrews has been heavily criticized by the coalition government over entering into a BRI. agreement with China. I'm less concerned about an agreement like that than others, maybe. I noticed that it emerged that Mr Andrews did seek guidance from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade as to whether we should enter into this agreement. And he was told that the department had no particular objection.
So this is another example of an issue that is, perhaps, to an extent being manipulated for political reasons. I'm not sure why people are getting so excited about an agreement that the state government in Australia has with China on an issue which as I understand it, would involve some sort of investment in infrastructure and so on, which may benefit the state as Mr. Andrews has said. This doesn't involve enabling China to access our telecommunications networks or anything like that. This has to do basically with investing in our infrastructure. On the face of it without knowing the details, I don't have a particular problem with that. As far as criticism is concerned from other figures in the Labor Party. I'm not sure how well informed they are about exactly what might be involved here. I'd be curious to know, the extent to which they have been informed. So I think this is what we would call in journalism, a developing story. Some of the criticism of Mr. Andrews has been. exaggerated.
10. Do you think essentially Labor and Liberal take a different stance regarding the diplomacy strategy to China?
In foreign policy, and security policy and defence policy, it’s been a tradition in this country that the two sides of politics try and maintain a relatively bipartisan position. Of course, that bipartisanship got thrown off course in the lead up to the 1972 election here in Australia when Mr. Whitlam made it clear that one of his first acts, as prime minister, would be to recognize China, the People's Republic of China and shift Australia's diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China. Generally speaking, the two sides try to maintain a relatively bipartisan approach.
There are differences of emphasis between Labor and the conservatives as regards China now, but to understand Australian politics, you have to understand that Labor is very cautious about adopting positions that could in any way, be regarded as antagonistic to the United States, or enable its conservative opponents to suggest Labor is not committed to the American alliance.
11. The relation between Australia and China has been tense in recent weeks. We see China implement an 80 percent barley tariff on Australia, while banned four Australian beef exporters. Just yesterday (June 5), China issued a travel warning to Australia, claiming the COVID-19 and racism against Chinese in Australia could make it dangerous to travel to Australia. China has taken trade as a bargain or bully method as some It states towards Australia. How is the currency situation discussed in Australia public?
I don't think anyone in Australia believes China's action is unconnected with its displeasure over Mr Morrison's attempts to lead on the inquiry on the Coronavirus issue. Then there is the abattoirs issue where beef imports to China have been curtailed on technical grounds. I mean that clearly is related to China's displeasure with Australia.
Now, what do Australians think of that? I think the sentiment is that it would be better not to be having these arguments with China, which are detrimental to the interests of our farmers and beef producers. The Chinese are also making threats about other commodities. I think it's another example of why we need to manage this relationship very carefully. This doesn't mean to say that you kowtow to China, that you agree with China all the time and to always assume the best of China. I think we have to pick our fights and pick our disagreements and be a bit more sophisticated about how we manage our relationship.
12. Lowy Institute published that Australians doubt either us or China will emerge stronger after COVID-19. What would be your explanation on this?
I'm not absolutely familiar with the poll. I know Lowy polling has been showing that Australians have adopted a more negative view towards China in the past year or two. That's understandable for various reasons. Negative publicity about the Chinese influence in Australia, of course, is a factor. China's growing power and influence regionally is another factor. People are anxious about China.
There’s a tendency in some sections of the media, to play on people's fears about China, in a way, which I don't think is particularly helpful. There’s no question that attitudes towards China have shifted somewhat over the last year or two. Some of which is justified, frankly. Vocal figures in Parliament who are very critical of China have got quite a lot of attention. So it's a very significant issue in this country.
13. The same Lowly poll said that in Australia only 32% of Australians trust China to act responsibly but fewer Australians have confidence in Donald Trump than in Xi Jinping.
I think this is part of the problem, frankly. In the past, Australia’s view was that American global leadership was relatively stable and reliable. And we could count on the United States to exercise global leadership. Because of the Trump presidency, people are questioning, obviously questioning America's ability to continue to assert what we've always taken for granted in this country. People hope that America will return to some sort of normalcy and the world will settle down again, and the US and China will work out some sort of reasonable compromise. But I'm not sure that is realistic. I think we have to be prepared possibly for a long period when things are quite unstable. As each side tests the limits of the other, one way or another, I just hope that this doesn't deteriorate into a situation where we have what would be a full blown trade war, which would be in nobody’s interests, or even something worse, like military conflict itself. We haven't even talked about Taiwan yet. These are very uncertain times. Australian attitudes reflect that uncertainty. The government itself in its approach to all these very complex questions reflects that uncertainty about exactly how it should position itself between the United States and China, and importantly, the extent to which we should seek to play a leadership role in our own region.
We can do more in the sense of providing creative leadership in the southwest Pacific, not in the sense that we should be ganging up on China or seeking to contain China. But in trying to achieve in partnership with our friends and allies, including the United States some sort of equilibrium and balance. We should try to do that in a constructive way. Through creative diplomacy, Australia can do that.
Prime Minister Bob Hawke and his successor, Paul Keating were the architects of the APEC agreement. And that's been very useful in terms of bringing countries of the Asia Pacific together. It’s that sort of diplomacy, which would be useful in the present situation.
14. Considering the US election is on the way, what will be brought to Australia if Joe Biden wins?
I think that would be an enormous relief. not just here in Australia but globally, frankly, if Mr Biden prevails and restores a sense of normality to America's engagement with the rest of the world. We’ve got to be realistic that one of the features of this American election campaign will be anti-China sentiments expressed on both sides of politics. Both the Democrats and Republicans will seek to outbid each other in their criticisms of China.
23. So this question is about the sino American new Cold War. So there have been this increasing concern since last year, and in your column, you disagree with the former prime minister John Howard's and his attitude. And you kind of elaborate a little bit on this as well, in the preface question, you say that Australia does not need to choose between us historical alignment with America and his geographical proximity to China is no longer sustainable. Would you mind elaborating a little bit more on
What John Howard was doing was to define Australia's national interests internationally in a very simple fashion. In other words, we don't have to choose between our geography where we are in the world and our history, our historic relationships with the United States. That served us pretty well for a long time. Things have clearly changed now. And the choices for us are not as clear cut as they might have been during the long period when Mr Howard was Prime Minister of this country.
So I guess my argument is that rather than not having to choose between the United States or China, as far as our relationships with both are concerned or either concerned, we have to try and find a way to navigate in a more subtle way that takes advantage of our relationship with the United States but make sure that relations with China are kept more or less on an even keel. That requires a greater degree of subtlety than we've seen in the recent past. It's no longer simply a case of not having to choose between one or the other.
15. Do you think currently Australia is making a good balance between the US and China? And if not, what do you think are the reasons that trap Australia from doing this?
I think there's a certain level of confusion in this country, about how to manage these two critical relationships from our point of view. We're in a kind of transition phase. And we're transitioning from not having to choose between our history and our geography to a new world, a new reality. We’re having difficulty managing that transition to a more nuanced, more sophisticated policy in managing our relationship with the United States, absolutely critical from a security standpoint, and our relationship with China. from an economic standpoint.
Arguments that you hear in the recent past that we can sort of wave a magic wand and suddenly we'll be less dependent on China economically, I don't think are realistic. China is going to be our dominant trading partner for the foreseeable future. Of course, we have to develop an alternative markets if we can.
16. Middle power is a term welcomed by countries like Australia and Canada. How do you evaluate Australia's practice as a middle power?
Our status as a middle power - it's a significant middle power, by the way, given our resource riches, geographical location, and the many advantages that we have - I think it gives us significant scope in our own region, obviously to play an important and possibly even expanded diplomatic role.
We're well placed to capitalize on that middle power status to exercise a creative approach to how we go about our business, and not simply appear to be just connected with the United States, you know, and following along the United States, whatever it chooses to do or not do. We've got to try and establish, at least as far as our relationships in this part of the world are concerned a stronger reputation for independent action, and creative, independent action.
17. And so do you think this ambition could be reached and how it could be reached in Australia?
I think, traditionally, Australia has always felt a bit insecure dependent on its relationship with a great power. Until the second world war it was Great Britain and after the Second World War, it's been the United States that has underpinned Australian security and our sense of wellbeing. Of course, the security relationship with America is absolutely critical. It makes absolutely no sense for Australia to presume to throw the baby out with the bathwater when it comes to security. But I think there is scope for us to exercise more independence in our engagement with the region.
Australia is well regarded in the region. It’s respected. I think it's acknowledged to be a significant economic power. I just think that one of our tendencies is not to punch above our weight - sometimes I think we've punched well below our weight - perhaps we should start thinking about asserting ourselves more. I don’t mean in a military way but taking leadership roles or creative positions in terms of regional diplomacy.
18. What is the current stance of Australia regarding Hong Kong?
During the 1997 hangover, I was in Beijing as a correspondent. I rented a room in the Hyatt hotel on Chang'an Jie, the main Boulevard running through Beijing. It had a view across Tiananmen Square where celebrations took place. The debate then was whether China would live up to its commitments to Hong Kong under the one country, two systems' formula and whether it would abide by the Basic Law that was agreed under which Britain hand Hong Kong back to China.
It was interesting that the foreign minister Marise Payne issued a joint statement with the Canadians and the British in response to China's proposed security law for Hong Kong. Australia issued a pretty firm statement about that but of course, getting China to take any notice is another matter. It was interesting to me that we did it in partnership with like-minded countries like the UK, Canada and the United States. I wondered when I saw that statement, whether the Australian Government hadn't learned a lesson from having gone it alone in its calls for the Coronavirus inquiry.
Now as far as Australia's attitude to Hong Kong is concerned, well, of course, Hong Kong's important from our perspective, I think there are something like 100,000 Australian passport holders in Hong Kong. It's an important business centre from Australia's point of view. a lot of Australian companies position themselves there. We have significant trade and commerce with Hong Kong. The other thing about Hong Kong, I think that's important to note is that if there was conflict in the streets of Hong Kong, involving mainland forces, then this would be a very, very negative development from the rest of the world's point of view. It will recall what happened In 1989 and would lead to sanctions being applied on China. This would be in no-one interests, least of all Australia. Let's hope we don't head down that road because I think that would be absolutely disastrous.
19. Will you see Australia stance towards Hong Kong, closer to the US approach or not？
I haven't detected a lot of difference between the Australian approach and the American approach. Of course, in all of this, America carries vastly more weight than Australia does in any interactions with China. Nevertheless, because of our interests there, we have an obligation. We certainly have an obligation to make our views known to China and make them known as clearly and emphatically as possible.
20. How will it affect Australia and how will it react if the situation between Beijing and Taiwan gets worsened dramatically in the upcoming years?
I've found it somewhat alarming that some of its recent statements about Taiwan, China has dropped the phrase peaceful reunification. Of course, the great fear has always been from a security standpoint in that part of Asia there would be conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Along with the situation in North Korea, those are the two major security preoccupations in the region. This is another reason quite frankly, why we have to tread very carefully in this present period and not allow a security situation in Asia to deteriorate or risk the possibility of conflict over Taiwan.
I've always thought conflict over Taiwan is an unlikely scenario, frankly, because of the consequences that would arise. But the fact that you can't exclude the possibility is a matter of concern, especially given the uncertainties that prevail in the world now.
21. It's my second last question. What do you think are the most urgent and vital issues for Australia's domestic society and economy?
I think the challenge for Australia is -- it's been this way for a very long time. We are a country that's enormously fortunate in all sorts of different ways. It's a cliché, but I think there's truth in it. We are a lucky country, an incredibly lucky country. We don't make the best of our advantages. Our good fortune makes us complacent. We could do better taking advantage of our good fortune. Of course, that's easy to say. But I think one of the problems the country has had over the year is perhaps we've been lulled into a false sense of security because of our resource richness. And we just assume that will go on forever. Perhaps this country hasn't felt the need to strive as hard as it might, or be as creative or engage with the region as effectively as it might. The challenge for Australia is to make the best of our good fortune. That means investing in our education, innovation infrastructure, and making our economy more competitive.
22. Are there any domestic insufficiencies that hinder Australia from taking a better position in international politics?
There are tendencies in this country that are less committed to an internationalist position, not unlike America First attitudes. There’s a risk that we might become less outward looking than we should be or need to be as a trading nation. Perhaps it’s because we lack a certain degree of self confidence about our place in the world and our ability to engage on occasions.
That’s traditionally been the case, a reluctance for us to accept the fact that we are the Metropolitan power in the South-West Pacific in our part of the world -- a certain reluctance to take on leadership roles, I think, it's probably a fair judgement. We could do better in taking advantage of our good luck. Perhaps we need to grow up!